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Abstract—We consider the problem of private linear compu-
tation (PLC) in a distributed storage system. In PLC, a user
wishes to compute a linear combination of f messages stored in
noncolluding databases while revealing no information about the
coefficients of the desired linear combination to the databases.
In extension of our previous work we employ linear codes to
encode the information on the databases. We show that the PLC
capacity, which is the ratio of the desired linear function size
and the total amount of downloaded information, matches the
maximum distance separable (MDS) coded capacity of private
information retrieval for a large class of linear codes that includes
MDS codes. In particular, the proposed converse is valid for any
number of messages and linear combinations, and the capacity
expression depends on the rank of the coefficient matrix obtained
from all linear combinations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) from public databases
has been the focus of attention for several decades in the
computer science community (see, e.g., [1], [2]). Recently,
the aspect of minimizing the communication cost, e.g., the
required rate or bandwidth of privately querying the databases
with the desired requests and downloading the corresponding
information from the databases has in particular been of
interest also in the information theory and coding commu-
nities (see, e.g., [3]–[10]). Those settings primarily focus on
distributed storage systems (DSSs), where data is encoded by
a linear code and then stored across several databases.
A recently proposed generalization of the PIR problem
[11]–[15] addresses the private computation (PC) of functions
of these messages. In PC a user has access to a given number
of databases and intends to compute a function of messages
stored in these databases. This function is kept private from the
databases, as they may be under the control of an adversary.
In [11], [12], the authors consider that the data is replicated
at each database, which are assumed to be noncolluding.
Both works characterize the fundamental information-theoretic
communication overhead needed to privately compute a given
linear function, called private linear computation (PLC), and
specify the corresponding capacity and achievable rates as
a function of the number of messages and the number of
databases, respectively. Interestingly, the obtained PLC ca-
pacity is equal to the PIR capacity of [6]. The extension
to the coded case is addressed in [13], [14]. In [13], a PC
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scheme for polynomial functions of the data over t colluding
databases is constructed by generalizing the star-product PIR
scheme of [9]. Specifically, for systematically coded storage,
this scheme considers functions that are polynomials of fixed
degree g, and achieves a rate matching the best asymptotic
rate (when the number of messages goes to infinity) of coded
PIR R = 1 − γc for g = t = 1 (the case of linear function
retrieval and noncolluding databases), where γc denotes the
code rate. In our previous work [14], we consider maximum
distance separable (MDS) coded storage and the computation
of linear message functions. The presented scheme is able to
achieve the MDS-coded PIR capacity in [8], referred to as the
MDS-PIR capacity in the sequel, and strictly generalizes the
achievable schemes in [11], [12].
On the other hand, for the case of noncolluding databases,
a PIR protocol for a DSS where data is stored using a
non-MDS linear code, is proposed in [10]. The protocol is
shown to achieve the asymptotic MDS-PIR capacity for several
example codes. In [16], [17], this approach is extended to
colluding databases and it is proved that both the asymptotic
and the nonasymptotic MDS-PIR capacity can be achieved
for a large class of linear codes in the noncolluding case.
For noncolluding databases, the first family of non-MDS
codes for which the PIR capacity is known is found in [18],
[19]. Further, PIR on linearly-coded databases for the case of
colluding databases is also addressed in [5], [9], [20]. For the
PLC case however, capacity results for arbitrary linear codes
have not been addressed so far in the open literature to the
best of our knowledge.
In this work, we intend to fill this void and propose an
extension of our previous works in [14] and [17] to PLC for
arbitrary linear codes with noncolluding databases. Surpris-
ingly, we show that the PLC capacity for a large class of linear
codes matches the MDS-PIR capacity when a user wishes
to compute an arbitrary linear combination of f independent
equal-sized messages over some finite field Fq , distributed
over n noncolluding linearly-coded databases. In particular, by
extending our previous work [14] where only achievable rates
are stated, we also adapt the converse proof of [19, Thm. 4] to
the PLC problem in this paper. In contrast to [12], our converse
is valid for any number of messages f and any number of
desired linear combinations µ, and our capacity result depends
on the rank of the coefficient matrix obtained from all µ linear
combinations.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation and Definitions
We denote by N the set of all positive integers and for
some a, b ∈ N, a ≤ b, [a : b] , {a, a+1, . . . , b}. Random and
deterministic quantities are carefully distinguished as follows.
A random variable is denoted by a capital Roman letter, e.g.,
X , while its realization is denoted by the corresponding small
Roman letter, e.g., x; vectors are boldfaced, e.g., X denotes a
random vector and x denotes a deterministic vector; random
matrices are represented by bold sans serif letters, e.g., X, and
X represents its realization. In addition, sets are denoted by
calligraphic upper case letters, e.g., X , and X c denotes the
complement of a set X in a universe set. For a given index
set S, we also write XS and YS to represent
{
X
(v) : v ∈ S
}
and
{
Yj : j ∈ S
}
, respectively. Furthermore, some constants
are also depicted by Greek letters or a special font, e.g., X.
We denote a submatrix of X that is restricted in columns by
the set I by X|I . The function H(·) represents the entropy of
its argument and I(X ;Y ) denotes the mutual information of
the random variables X , Y . (·)T denotes the transpose of its
argument, while rank(V) denotes the rank of a matrix V. We
use the customary code parameters [n, k] to denote a code C
over the finite field Fq of blocklength n and dimension k. A
generator matrix of C is denoted by GC . A set of coordinates
of C , I ⊆ [1 : n], of size k is said to be an information set if
and only if GC |I is invertible. The function χ(x) denotes the
support of a vector x.
B. System Model
The PLC problem for coded DSSs is described as follows.
We consider a DSS that stores f messages W(1), . . . ,W(f),
where each message W(m) =
(
W
(m)
i,j
)
, m ∈ [1 : f ], can be
seen as a random matrix of size β× k over Fq with β, k ∈ N.
Each message is encoded using an [n, k] code as follows. Let
W
(m)
i =
(
W
(m)
i,1 , . . . ,W
(m)
i,k
)
, i ∈ [1 : β], be a message vector
corresponding to the i-th row ofW(m). EachW
(m)
i is encoded
by an [n, k] code C over Fq into a length-n codewordC
(m)
i =(
C
(m)
i,1 , . . . , C
(m)
i,n
)
. The βf generated codewords C
(m)
i are
then arranged in the array C =
(
(C(1))T| . . . |(C(f))T
)
T
of
dimensions βf × n, where C(m) =
(
(C
(m)
1 )
T| . . . |(C
(m)
β )
T
)
T
.
The code symbols C
(m)
1,j , . . . , C
(m)
β,j , m ∈ [1 : f ], for all f
messages are stored on the j-th database, j ∈ [1 : n].
Let L , β · k. Then, each message W(m), m ∈ [1 : f ],
can also be seen as a random vector variable W
(m) =
(W
(m)
1 , . . . ,W
(m)
L
) of L symbols that are chosen indepen-
dently and uniformly at random from Fq. Thus,
H
(
W
(m)
)
= L, ∀m ∈ [1 : f ],
H
(
W
(1), ...,W(f)
)
= fL (in q-ary units).
C. Private Linear Computation for Coded DSSs
We consider the case where no set of databases can collude.
A user wishes to privately compute exactly one linear function
from the µ candidate linear functions X(1), . . . ,X(µ) from
the coded DSS, where X(v) =
(
X
(v)
1 , . . . , X
(v)
L
)
. The µ-tuple(
X
(1)
l , . . . , X
(µ)
l
)
T
, ∀ l ∈ [1 : L], is mapped by a deterministic
matrix V of size µ× f over Fq by

X
(1)
l
...
X
(µ)
l

 = Vµ×f


W
(1)
l
...
W
(f)
l

. (1)
Hence, the user privately generates an index v ∈ [1 : µ] and
wishes to compute the v-th linear function while keeping the
index v private from each database. Here, we also assume that
the rank of V is equal to rank(V) = r ≤ min{µ, f} and the
indices corresponding to a basis for the row space of V are
denoted by the set L , {ℓ1, . . . , ℓr} ⊆ [1 : µ].
In order to retrieve the linear function X(v) from the coded
DSS, v ∈ [1 : µ], the user sends a query Q
(v)
j over Fq to the j-
th database for all j ∈ [1 : n]. Since the queries are generated
by the user without any prior knowledge of the realizations of
the candidate linear functions, the queries are independent of
the linear functions. In other words, we have
I
(
X
(1), . . . ,X(µ) ;Q
(v)
1 , . . . , Q
(v)
n
)
= 0, ∀ v ∈ [1 : µ].
In response to the received query, database j sends the answer
A
(v)
j back to the user. A
(v)
j is a deterministic function of Q
(v)
j
and the data stored in the database. Thus, ∀ v ∈ [1 : µ],
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣∣Q(v)j ,C[1:f ]
)
= 0, ∀ j ∈ [1 : n].
Next, we define a PLC protocol for coded DSSs as follows.
Definition 1: Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases
storing f messages using an [n, k] code. The user wishes to
retrieve the v-th linear function X(v), v ∈ [1 : µ], from the
available information Q
(v)
j and A
(v)
j , j ∈ [1 : n]. For a PLC
protocol, the following conditions must be satisfied ∀ v ∈ [1 :
µ],
[Privacy]
I
(
v ;Q
(v)
j , A
(v)
j ,X
(1), . . . ,X(µ)
)
= 0, ∀ j ∈ [1 : n],
[Recovery]
H
(
X
(v)
∣∣A(v)1 , . . . , A(v)n , Q(v)1 , . . . , Q(v)n ) = 0.
To measure the efficiency of a PLC protocol, we consider
the required number of downloaded symbols for retrieving the
L symbols of the candidate linear function.
Definition 2 (PLC Rate and Capacity for Coded DSSs): The
rate of a PLC protocol, denoted by R, is the ratio of the desired
linear function size L to the total required download cost D,
i.e.,
R ,
L
D
.
The PLC capacity CPLC is the maximum possible PLC rate
over all possible PLC protocols for a given [n, k] storage code.
D. MDS-PIR Capacity-Achieving Codes
In [16], [17], a PIR protocol for any linearly-coded DSS that
uses an [n, k] code to store f messages, named Protocol 1,
is proposed. The corresponding PIR rate depends on the
following property of the underlying storage code C .
Definition 3: Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code. A ν × n
binary matrix Λκ,ν(C ) is said to be a PIR achievable rate
matrix for C if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) The Hamming weight of each column of Λκ,ν is κ, and
2) for each matrix row λi, i ∈ [1 : ν], χ(λi) always
contains an information set.
In other words, each coordinate j of C , j ∈ [1 : n], appears
exactly κ times in {χ(λi)}i∈[1:ν], and every set χ(λi) contains
an information set.
In [16], [17], it is shown that the MDS-PIR capacity (i.e.,
the PIR capacity for a DSS where data is encoded and stored
using an MDS code) can be achieved using Protocol 1 for
a special class of [n, k] codes. In particular, to achieve the
MDS-PIR capacity using Protocol 1, the [n, k] storage code
should possess a specific underlying structure as given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([16], [17]): Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k]
code C to store f messages. If a PIR achievable rate matrix
Λκ,ν(C ) with
κ
ν
= k
n
exists, then the MDS-PIR capacity
CMDS-PIR ,
(
1−
k
n
)[
1−
(k
n
)f]−1
is achievable.
This gives rise to the following definition.
Definition 4: A PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C ) with
κ
ν
= k
n
for an [n, k] code C is called an MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving matrix, and C is referred to as an MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving code.
In Section IV, we will present a PLC protocol and a
general achievable rate for any rank(V) = r by using the
PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν of an [n, k] code.
III. PLC CAPACITY FOR MDS-PIR CAPACITY-ACHIEVING
CODES
The main result of this paper is the derivation of the PLC
capacity for a coded DSS where data is encoded and stored
using a linear code from the class of MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving codes introduced in [16], [17], which is stated in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] MDS-
PIR capacity-achieving code C to store f messages. Then,
the maximum achievable PLC rate over all possible PLC
protocols, i.e., the PLC capacity, is
CPLC ,
(
1−
k
n
)[
1−
(k
n
)r]−1
(2)
for any rank r of the linear mapping from (1).
The achievable scheme is provided in Section IV, while
the converse proof is given in Section V. Note that the
class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes includes MDS
codes, cyclic codes, Reed-Muller codes, and certain classes
of distance-optimal local reconstruction codes [16], [17].
We remark here that it is known that if rank(V) = f , then
the PLC capacity for an MDS-coded DSS is equal to the MDS-
PIR capacity [14], i.e., if rank(V) = f , then
CPLC =
(
1−
k
n
)[
1−
(k
n
)f]−1
= CMDS-PIR.
IV. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
We start with a coded PIR query scheme for a message of µ
dependent virtual messages. Given that the messages are stored
using an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code C , we find
the associated ν×n MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix Λκ,ν
and obtain the PIR interference matrices Aκ×n and B(ν−κ)×n
as given by the following definition.
Definition 5 ([16], [17]): For a given ν×n PIR achievable
rate matrix Λκ,ν(C ) = (λu,j), we define the PIR interference
matrices Aκ×n = (ai,j) and B(ν−κ)×n = (bi,j) for the code
C with
ai,j , u if λu,j = 1, ∀j ∈ [1 : n], i ∈ [1 : κ], u ∈ [1 : ν],
bi,j , u if λu,j = 0, ∀j ∈ [1 : n], i ∈ [1 : ν − κ], u ∈ [1 : ν].
Note that in Definition 5, for each j ∈ [1 : n], distinct
values of u ∈ [1 : ν] should be assigned for all i. Thus, the
assignment is not unique in the sense that the order of the
entries of each column of A and B can be permuted. Next, for
the sake of illustrating our query set generation algorithm, we
make use of the following definition.
Definition 6: By S(u|Aκ×n) we denote the set of column
coordinates of matrix Aκ×n = (ai,j) in which at least one of
its entries is equal to u, i.e.,
S(u|Aκ×n) , {j ∈ [1 : n] : ∃ ai,j = u, i ∈ [1 : κ]}.
As a result, we require the size of the message to be L =
νµ · k (i.e., β = νµ). The scheme is completed in µ rounds.
A. Query Generation
Before running the main algorithm to generate query sets,
the following index preparation for the coded symbols stored
in each database is performed.
1) Index Preparation: The goal is to make the coded
symbols queried from each database to appear to be chosen
randomly and independently from the desired linear function
index. Note that the linear function is computed separately
for the t-th row of all messages, t ∈ [1 : β]. Therefore,
similar to the PLC scheme in [12] and the MDS-coded PLC
scheme in [14], we apply a permutation that is fixed across all
coded symbols for the t-th row to maintain the dependency
across the associated message elements. Let π(·) be a random
permutation function over [1 : β], and let
U
(v)
t,j , vvCπ(t),j, t ∈ [1 : β], j ∈ [1 : n],
denote the t-th permuted code symbol associated with the v-
th virtual message X(v) stored in the j-th database. Here, vv
represents the v-th row vector of the matrix Vµ×f = (vi,j) and
Ct,j ,
(
C
(1)
t,j , . . . , C
(f)
t,j
)
T
. The permutation π(·) is randomly
selected privately and uniformly by the user.
2) Preliminaries: For τ ∈ [1 : µ], a sum U
(v1)
i1,j
+ U
(v2)
i2,j
+
· · ·+U
(vτ )
iτ ,j
, j ∈ [1 : n], of τ distinct symbols is a τ -sum for any
subset {i1, i2, . . . , iτ} ⊆ [1 : β], and {v1, v2, . . . , vτ} ⊆ [1 : µ]
determines the type of the τ -sum. Since we have
(
µ
τ
)
different
selections of τ distinct elements out of µ elements, a τ -sum
can have
(
µ
τ
)
different types. The query generation procedure
is subdivided into µ rounds. For a requested linear function
indexed by v ∈ [1 : µ], a query set Q
(v)
j , j ∈ [1 : n],
is composed of µ disjoint subsets, one generated by each
round τ ∈ [1 : µ]. For each round the query subset is
further subdivided into two subsets. The first subsetQ
(v)
j (D; τ)
consists of τ -sums with a single symbol from the desired
linear function and τ − 1 symbols from undesired linear
functions, while the second subset Q
(v)
j (U ; τ) contains τ -
sums with symbols only from undesired linear functions. To
this end, in the scheme we introduce κn auxiliary query
sets Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ), i ∈ [1 : κ], where each query consists
of a distinct symbol from the desired linear function and
τ − 1 symbols from undesired linear functions, and (ν − κ)n
auxiliary query sets Q
(v)
j (bi,j ,U ; τ), i ∈ [1 : ν − κ], to
represent the side information query sets for each database
j ∈ [1 : n]. We utilize these sets to generate the query sets of
each round according to the PIR interference matrices Aκ×n
and B(ν−κ)×n. The query sets for all databases are generated
by Algorithm 1 through the following procedures.1
3) Initialization (Round τ = 1): In the initialization step,
the algorithm generates the auxiliary queries for the first round.
This round is described by Steps 5 to 11 of Algorithm 1, where
we have τ = 1 for the τ -sum. At this point, Algorithm 1 in-
vokes the subroutine Initial-Round given in Algorithm 2
to generate Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; 1), i ∈ [1 : κ], such that each of
these query sets contains α1 = κ
µ−1 distinct code symbols.
Furthermore, to maintain function symmetry, the algorithm
asks each database for the same number of distinct symbols
of all other linear functions in Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,U ; 1), i ∈ [1 : κ],
resulting in a total number of
(
µ−1
1
)
κµ−1 symbols. As a result,
the queried code symbols in the auxiliary query sets for each
database are symmetric with respect to all linear function
vectors indexed by v′ ∈ [1 : µ]. We associate the symbols of
undesired functions in κ groups, each placed in the undesired
query sets Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,U ; 1), i ∈ [1 : κ], to be exploited as
distinct side information for the second round of the scheme.
Since this procedure produces κ undesired query sets for each
database, database symmetry is maintained.
4) Desired Function Symbols for Rounds τ > 1: For
the following rounds a similar process is repeated in terms
of generating auxiliary query sets containing distinct code
symbols from the desired linear function U(v) = (U
(v)
t,j ).
1Note that a query Q
(v)
j sent to the j-th database usually indicates the
row indices of the stored code symbols that the user requests, while the
answer A
(v)
j to the query Q
(v)
j refers to the particular code symbols requested
through the query. In Algorithm 1, with some abuse of notation, the generated
queries are sets containing their answers.
Algorithm 1: Q-Gen
Input : v, µ, κ, ν, n, Aκ×n, and B(ν−κ)×n
Output: Q
(v)
1 , . . . , Q
(v)
n
1 for τ ∈ [1 : µ] do
2 Q
(v)
j (D; τ )← ∅, Q
(v)
j (U ; τ )← ∅, j ∈ [1 : n]
3 ατ ← κ
µ−1 +
∑τ−1
h=1
(
µ−1
h
)
κµ−(h+1)(ν − κ)h
4 ⊲ Generate query sets for the initial
round
5 if τ = 1 then
6 for u ∈ [1 : ν] do
7 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
8 Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ ),Q
(v)
j (u,U ; τ )←
Initial-Round(u, ατ , j, v, τ )
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 ⊲ Generate query sets for the following
rounds τ > 1
13 else
14 for u ∈ [1 : ν] do
15 ⊲ Generate desired symbols for the
following rounds τ > 1
16 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
17 Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ )← Desired-Q(u, ατ , j, v, τ )
18 end
19 ⊲ Generate side information for the
following rounds τ > 1
20 for j ∈ S(u|B(ν−κ)×n) do
21 Q
(v)
j (u,U ; τ − 1)← Exploit-SI(u,Q
(v)
1 (u,U , τ −
1), . . . , Q
(v)
n (u,U , τ − 1), j, v, τ )
22 end
23 end
24 ⊲ Generate the final desired query sets
for the following rounds τ > 1
25 for j ∈ [1 : n] do
26 Q˜
(v)
j (U ; τ − 1)←
⋃
i∈[1:ν−κ]
Q
(v)
j (bi,j ,U ; τ − 1)
27 Q˜
(v)
j (1,U ; τ − 1), . . . , Q˜
(v)
j (κ,U ; τ − 1)←
Partition
(
Q˜
(v)
j (U ; τ − 1)
)
28 for i ∈ [1 : κ] do
29 Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ )←
SetAddition
(
Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ ), Q˜
(v)
j (i,U ; τ − 1)
)
30 end
31 end
32 ⊲ Generate the query sets of undesired
symbols by forcing message symmetry for
the following rounds τ > 1
33 for u ∈ [1 : ν] do
34 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
35 Q
(v)
j (u,U ; τ )← M-Sym
(
Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ ), j, v, τ
)
36 end
37 end
38 end
39 for u ∈ [1 : ν] do
40 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
41 Q
(v)
j (D; τ )← Q
(v)
j (D; τ ) ∪Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ )
42 Q
(v)
j (U ; τ )← Q
(v)
j (U ; τ ) ∪Q
(v)
j (u,U ; τ )
43 end
44 end
45 end
46 for j ∈ [1 : n] do
47 Q
(v)
j ←
⋃
τ∈[1:µ]
(
Q
(v)
j (D; τ ) ∪Q
(v)
j (U ; τ )
)
48 end
Algorithm 2: Initial-Round
Input : u, ατ , j, v, and τ
Output: φ(v)(u,D; τ ), φ(v)(u,U ; τ )
1 φ(v)(u,D; τ )← ∅, φ(v)(u,U ; τ )← ∅
2 for l ∈ [1 : ατ ] do
3 φ(v)(u,D; τ )← φ(v)(u,D; τ ) ∪
{
U
(v)
(u−1)·ατ+l,j
}
4 φ(v)(u,U ; τ )← φ(v)(u,U ; τ ) ∪(
µ⋃
v′=1
{
U
(v′)
(u−1)·ατ+l,j
}
\
{
U
(v)
(u−1)·ατ+l,j
})
5 end
This is accomplished in Steps 16 to 18 by calling the
subroutine Desired-Q, given in Algorithm 3, to generate
Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ), i ∈ [1 : κ], such that each of these query sets
contains (ατ − 1)−ατ−1+1 =
(
µ−1
τ−1
)
κµ−(τ−1+1)(ν− κ)τ−1
distinct code symbols from the desired linear function U(v).
Algorithm 3: Desired-Q
Input : u, ατ , j, v, and τ
Output: φ(v)(u,D; τ )
1 φ(v)(u,D; τ )← ∅
2 for l ∈ [ατ−1 : ατ − 1] do
3 φ(v)(u,D; τ )← φ(v)(u,D; τ ) ∪
{
U
(v)
l·ν+u,j
}
4 end
5) Side Information Exploitation: In Steps 20 to 22, we
generate the side information query sets Q
(v)
j (bi′,j ,U ; τ − 1),
i′ ∈ [1 : ν−κ], from the auxiliary query sets Q
(v)
1 (ai,1,U ; τ−
1), . . . , Q
(v)
n (ai,n,U ; τ − 1), i ∈ [1 : κ], of the previous round
τ−1, τ ∈ [2 : µ], by applying the subrountine Exploit-SI,
given by Algorithm 4. This subroutine is extended from [12]
based on our coded storage scenario. Note that in Algorithm 4
the function Reproduce(j,Q
(v)
j′ (u,U ; τ − 1)), j
′ ∈ [1 : n] \
{j}, simply reproduces all the queries in the auxiliary query
set Q
(v)
j′ (u,U ; τ − 1) with a different coordinate j.
Algorithm 4: Exploit-SI
Input : u, Q
(v)
1 (u,U ; τ − 1), . . . , Q
(v)
n (u,U ; τ − 1), j, v, and
τ
Output: φ(v)(u,U ; τ − 1)
1 φ(v)(u,U ; τ − 1)← ∅
2 for i ∈ [1 : κ] do
3 for j′ ∈ [1 : n] \ {j} do
4 if u = ai,j′ then
5 φ(v)(u,U ; τ − 1)← Reproduce(j, Q(v)
j′
(u,U ; τ − 1))
6 break
7 end
8 end
9 end
Next, we update the desired query sets Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ) in
Steps 25 to 31. First, the function Partition
(
Q˜
(v)
j (U ; τ −
1)
)
denotes a procedure that divides a set into κ disjoint
equally-sized subsets. This is viable since based on the subrou-
tine Initial-Round and the following subroutine M-Sym,
one can show that
∣∣Q˜(v)j (U ; τ − 1)∣∣ = (µ−1τ−1)κµ−(τ−1)(ν −
κ)(τ−1)−1 · (ν − κ) for each round τ ∈ [2 : µ], which is
always divisible by κ. Secondly, we assign the new query set
of desired symbols Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ) for the current round by
using an element-wise set addition SetAddition(Q1, Q2).
The element-wise set addition is defined as
{
qil + qi′l : qil ∈
Q1, qi′
l
∈ Q2, l ∈ [1 : ρ]
}
with |Q1| = |Q2| = ρ, where ρ is an
appropriate integer. In Steps 33 to 37, the subroutine M-Sym,
given in Algorithm 5, is invoked to generate the undesired
query sets Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,U ; τ) by utilizing message symmetry.
This subroutine selects symbols of undesired messages to
generate τ -sums that enforce symmetry in the round queries.
The procedure resembles the subroutine M-Sym proposed in
[12]. In Algorithm 5, Πτ denotes the set of all possible
selections of τ distinct indices in [1 : µ] and Lexico(Πτ )
denotes the corresponding set of ordered selections (the indices
(v1, . . . , vτ ) of a selection of Πτ are ordered in natural
lexicographical order). Further, the notation U
(vx)
∗,j implies that
the row index of the code symbol can be arbitrary. This is
the case since only the linear function indices (v1, . . . , vτ ) are
necessary to determine iz , ∀ z ∈ [1 : τ ]. As a result, symmetry
over the linear functions is maintained.
Algorithm 5: M-Sym
Input : Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ ), j, v, and τ
Output: φ(v)(u,U ; τ )
1 φ(v)(u,U ; τ )← ∅
2 for (v1, . . . , vτ ) ∈ Lexico(Πτ ), v /∈ {v1, . . . , vτ} do
3 φ(v)(u,U ; τ )← φ(v)(u,U ; τ ) ∪
{
U
(v1)
i1,j
+ . . .+ U
(vτ )
iτ ,j
}
such that ∀ z ∈ [1 : τ ],
∃U (v)iz ,j +
∑
x∈[1:τ ]
x 6=z
U
(vx)
∗,j ∈ Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ )
4 end
6) Query Set Assembly: Finally, in Steps 39 to 48, we
assemble each query set from disjoint query subsets obtained
in all τ rounds. It can be shown that Q
(v)
j (D; τ) ∪Q
(v)
j (U ; τ)
contains κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1 τ -sums for every τ -sum type.
B. Sign Assignment and Redundancy Elimination
After Algorithm 1, the user will know which row indices
of the stored code symbols he/she is going to request. To
reduce the total number of downloaded symbols, the linear
dependency among the candidate linear functions is exploited.
We adopt a similar sign assignment process over σ
(v)
t ∈
{+1,−1} to each symbol in the query sets: σ
(v)
t U
(v)
t,j , based
on the desired linear function index v as introduced in [12,
Sec. 4.2]. Here, the sign σ
(v)
t is privately generated by the
user with a uniform distribution over {−1,+1}. The intuition
behind the sign assignment is to introduce a uniquely solvable
equation system from the different τ -sum types given the side
information available from all other databases. By obtaining
such a system of equations in each round, the user can
determine some of the queries offline to decode the desired
linear function and/or interference, thus reducing the download
rate. Based on this insight we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For all v ∈ [1 : µ], each database j ∈ [1 : n],
and based on the side information available from the databases,
there are
(
µ−r
τ
)
redundant τ -sum types out of all possible types(
µ
τ
)
in each round τ ∈ [1 : µ− r] of the query sets.
Since repetition codes and MDS codes are MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving codes, Lemma 1 generalizes [12, Lem. 1]
and [14, Lem. 1]. We can extend the proof of [12, Lem. 1]
to our scheme based on the insight that the redundancy
resulting from the linear dependencies between messages is
also present for MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes. We now
make the final modification to our PLC query sets. We first
directly apply the sign assignment σ
(v)
t , then remove all τ -
sums corresponding to redundant τ -sum types from every
round τ ∈ [1 : µ] (see Lemma 1). Note that, in our case the
redundancy is dependent on the rank of the functions matrix,
rank(V) = r ≤ min{µ, f}, thus generalizing the MDS-coded
PLC case. Finally, we generate the queries Q
(v)
1:n.
C. Example
To illustrate the key idea of the scheme we use the following
example.
Consider four messages W
(1)
, W
(2)
, W
(3)
, and W
(4)
that
are stored in a DSS using a [4, 2]MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
code C with generator matrix
G
C =
(
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
)
for which Λ1,2 =
(
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
)
is a PIR achievable rate matrix. According to Definition 5 we
obtain the PIR interference matrices A1×4 =
(
1 2 1 2
)
and B1×4 =
(
2 1 2 1
)
. Suppose that the user wishes to
obtain a linear function X(v) from a set of µ = 3 candidate
linear functions, i.e., v ∈ [1 : 3], defined by
Vµ×f =

1 0 0 11 1 0 0
2 1 0 1

.
We simplify notation by letting xt,j = U
(1)
t,j , yt,j = U
(2)
t,j ,
and zt,j = U
(3)
t,j for all t ∈ [1 : β], j ∈ [1 : n], where β =
νµ = 8. Let the desired linear function index be v = 1. For this
example, the construction of the query sets is briefly presented
in the following steps.
Initialization (Round τ = 1): Algorithm 1 starts with τ = 1
to generate auxiliary query sets for each database holding
κµ−1 = 1 distinct instances of xt,j . By message symmetry
this also applies to yt,j and zt,j . The auxiliary query sets for
the first round are given in Table I(a). Note that the queries
for zt,j can be generated offline by the user and thus are later
removed from the query sets.
Following Rounds (τ > 1): As can be seen from Ta-
ble I(b) and (c), using the interference matrices A1×4 and
B1×4, the algorithm further generates the auxiliary query sets
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; τ) that contain new symbols to be queried jointly
with symbols of the desired linear function during the exploita-
tion of side information for the j-th database, j ∈ [1 : n]. After
generating the desired auxiliary query sets Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; τ),
the undesired auxiliary query sets Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,U ; τ) are gen-
erated by enforcing message symmetry. Finally, we apply
the sign assignment scheme to the query sets and remove
redundant queries from each database. The resulting queries
are shown in Table II.
The PLC rate of the achievable scheme is equal to ν
µ·k
D
=
8·2
6·4 =
2
3 , which is equal to the PLC capacity in (2) with
rank(V) = 2.
TABLE I
AUXILIARY QUERY SETS FOR EACH ROUND. THE MAGENTA DASHED
ARROWS AND THE CYAN ARROWS INDICATE THAT THE EXPLOIT-SI
ALGORITHM AND THE M-SYM ALGORITHM ARE USED, RESPECTIVELY.
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; 1) x(1−1)·1+1,1 x(2−1)·1+1,2 x(1−1)·1+1,3 x(2−1)·1+1,4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,U ; 1)
y(1−1)·1+1,1 y(2−1)·1+1,2 y(1−1)·1+1,3 y(2−1)·1+1,4
z(1−1)·1+1,1 z(2−1)·1+1,2 z(1−1)·1+1,3 z(2−1)·1+1,4
(a)
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; 2)
x1·2+1,1 + y2,1 x1·2+2,2 + y1,2 x1·2+1,3 + y2,3 x1·2+2,4 + y1,4
x2·2+1,1 + z2,1 x2·2+2,2 + z1,2 x2·2+1,3 + z2,3 x2·2+2,4 + z1,4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,U ; 2) y4+1,1 + z2+1,1 y4+2,2 + z2+2,2 y4+1,3 + z2+1,3 y4+2,4 + z2+2,4
(b)
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; 3) x3·2+1,1 + y6,1 + z4,1 x3·2+2,2 + y5,2 + z3,2 x3·2+1,3 + y6,3 + z4,3 x3·2+2,4 + y5,4 + z3,4
(c)
TABLE II
FINAL QUERY SETS (AFTER SIGN ASSIGNMENT AND REMOVAL OF
REDUNDANT QUERIES) FOR ROUNDS ONE TO THREE FOR A CODED DSS
THAT USES THE [4, 2] CODE OF SECTION IV-C TO STORE f = 4
MESSAGES.
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (D; 1) x1,1 x2,2 x1,3 x2,4
Q
(1)
j (U ; 1) y1,1 y2,2 y1,3 y2,4
Q
(1)
j (D; 2)
x3,1 − y2,1 x4,2 − y1,2 x3,3 − y2,3 x4,4 − y1,4
x5,1 − z2,1 x6,2 − z1,2 x5,3 − z2,3 x6,4 − z1,4
Q
(1)
j (U ; 2) y5,1 − z3,1 y6,2 − z4,2 y5,3 − z3,3 y6,4 − z4,4
Q
(1)
j (D; 3) x7,1 − y6,1 + z4,1 x8,2 − y5,2 + z3,2 x7,3 − y6,3 + z4,3 x8,4 − y5,4 + z3,4
D. Achievable Rate
The resulting achievable rate of Algorithm 1 after removing
redundant τ -sums according to Lemma 1 is given as
R
(a)
=
kνµ
n
∑µ
τ=1
((
µ
τ
)
−
(
µ−r
τ
))
κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1
(b)
=
κνµ
ν
∑µ
τ=1
((
µ
τ
)
−
(
µ−r
τ
))
κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1
=
νµ
(
ν−κ
ν
)
∑µ
τ=1
((
µ
τ
)
−
(
µ−r
τ
))
κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ
...
(c)
=
νµ
(
1− κ
ν
)
νµ− κrνµ−r
=
(
1−
κ
ν
)[
1−
(κ
ν
)r]−1
,
where we define
(
m
n
)
, 0 if m < n; (a) follows from the
PLC rate in Definition 2, the fact that Q
(v)
j (D; τ)∪Q
(v)
j (U ; τ)
contains κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1 τ -sums for every τ -sum type,
and Lemma 1; (b) follows from Definition 4; and (c) follows
by adapting similar steps as in the proof given in [14].
V. CONVERSE PROOF
In [18], [19], the PIR capacity of MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving codes is shown to be equal to the MDS-PIR capacity.
In this section, we adapt the converse proof of [19, Thm. 4] to
the scenario of the linearly-coded PLC problem. We will show
that the PLC capacity of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes
is equal to (2). Before we proceed with the converse proof,
we give some general results that are useful for the proof.
1) From the condition of privacy,
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣X(v),Q) = H(A(v′)j ∣∣X(v),Q), (3)
where v 6= v′, v, v′ ∈ [1 : µ], and Q ,
{
Q
(v)
j : v ∈ [1 :
µ], j ∈ [1 : n]
}
denotes the set of all possible queries
made by the user. Although this seems to be intuitively
true, a proof of this property is still required and can be
found in [21, Lem. 3].
2) Consider a PLC protocol for a coded DSS that uses an
[n, k] code C to store f messages. For any subset of
linear combinations V ⊆ [1 : µ] and for any information
set I of C , we have
H
(
A
(v)
I
∣∣XV ,Q) =∑
j∈I
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣XV ,Q). (4)
The proof uses the linear independence of the columns
of a generator matrix of C corresponding to an in-
formation set, and can be seen as a simple extension
of [8, Lem. 2] or [21, Lem. 4]. This argument ap-
plies to the case of PLC due to the fact that A
(v)
I
is still a deterministic function of independent ran-
dom variables {Cj : j ∈ I} and Q, where Cj ,(
C
(1)
1,j , . . . , C
(1)
β,j , C
(2)
1,j , . . . , C
(f)
β,j
)
T
denotes the f coded
chunks that are stored in the j-th database.
Next, we state Shearer’s Lemma, which represents a very
useful entropy method for combinatorial problems.
Lemma 2 (Shearer’s Lemma [22]): Let S be a collection
of subsets of [1 : n], with each j ∈ [1 : n] included in at least
κ members of S . For random variables Z1, . . . , Zn, we have∑
S∈S
H(ZS) ≥ κH(Z1, . . . , Zn).
For our converse proof for the coded PLC problem, we also
need the following lemma, whose proof has been omitted due
to lack of space.
Lemma 3: Consider the linear mapping V = (vi,j) defined
in (1) with rank(V) = r where vi1,j1 , . . . , vir ,jr are the
entries corresponding to the pivot elements of V. It follows
that
(
X
(i1), . . . ,X(ih)
)
and
(
W
(j1), . . . ,W(jh)
)
are identi-
cally distributed, for some h ∈ [1 : r]. In other words,
H
(
X
(i1), . . . ,X(ih)
)
= hL, h ∈ [1 : r].
Now, we are ready for the converse proof. By [17, Lem. 2],
since the code C is MDS-PIR capacity-achieving, there exist
ν information sets I1, . . . , Iν such that each coordinate j ∈
[1 : n] is included in exactly κ members of I = {I1, . . . , Iν}
with κ
ν
= k
n
.
Applying the chain rule of entropy we have
H
(
A
(v)
[1:n]
∣∣XV ,Q) ≥ H(A(v)Ii ∣∣XV ,Q), ∀ i ∈ [1 : ν].
Let v ∈ V and v′ ∈ Vc , [1 : µ] \ V . Following similar
steps as in the proof given in [8], [21], we get
ν H
(
A
(v)
[1:n]
∣∣XV ,Q)
≥
ν∑
i=1
H
(
A
(v)
Ii
∣∣XV ,Q)
=
ν∑
i=1

∑
j∈Ii
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣XV ,Q)

 (5)
=
ν∑
i=1

∑
j∈Ii
H
(
A
(v′)
j
∣∣XV ,Q)

 (6)
=
ν∑
i=1
H
(
A
(v′)
Ii
∣∣XV ,Q) (7)
≥ κH
(
A
(v′)
[1:n]
∣∣XV ,Q) (8)
= κ
[
H
(
A
(v′)
[1:n],X
(v′)
∣∣XV ,Q)
−H
(
X
(v′)
∣∣A(v′)[1:n],XV ,Q)
]
= κ
[
H
(
X
(v′)
∣∣XV ,Q)
+ H
(
A
(v′)
[1:n]
∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q)− 0] (9)
= κ
[
H
(
X
(v′)
∣∣XV)+H(A(v′)[1:n] ∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q)
]
, (10)
where (5) and (7) follow from (4); (6) is because of (3); (8)
is due to Shearer’s Lemma; (9) is from the fact that the v′-th
linear combination X
(v′)
is determined by the answers A
(v′)
[1:n]
and all possible queries Q; and finally, (10) follows from the
independence between all possible queries and the messages.
Therefore, we can conclude that
H
(
A
(v)
[1:n]
∣∣XV ,Q)
≥
κ
ν
H
(
X
(v′)
∣∣XV)+ κ
ν
H
(
A
(v′)
[1:n]
∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q)
=
k
n
H
(
X
(v′)
∣∣XV)+ k
n
H
(
A
(v′)
[1:n]
∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q), (11)
where we have used Definition 4 to obtain (11).
Since there are in total µ linear combinations and L ,
{ℓ1, . . . , ℓr} ⊆ [1 : µ] is the set of row indices corresponding
to the selected basis for the row space of V, we can recursively
use (11) r − 1 times to obtain
H
(
A
(ℓ1)
[1:n]
∣∣X(ℓ1),Q)
≥
r−1∑
v=1
(k
n
)v
H
(
X
(ℓv+1)
∣∣X{ℓ1,...,ℓv})
+
(k
n
)r−1
H
(
A
(ℓr)
[1:n]
∣∣X{ℓ1,...,ℓr},Q)
≥
r−1∑
v=1
(k
n
)v
H
(
X
(ℓv+1)
∣∣X{ℓ1,...,ℓv}) (12)
=
r−1∑
v=1
(k
n
)v
L, (13)
where (12) follows from the nonnegativity of entropy. (13)
holds since it follows from Lemma 3 that H
(
X
(ℓv+1)
∣∣
X
{ℓ1,...,ℓv}
)
= H
(
X
(ℓv+1)
)
= L. Here, we also remark that
the recursive steps follow the same principle of the general
converse for dependent PIR (DPIR) from [15, Thm. 1]. In
[15], the authors claim that the general converse for the DPIR
problem strongly depends on the chosen permutation of the
indices of the candidate functions. However, the best index
permutation for the candidate linear functions for the PLC
problem results from finding a basis for V. Now,
L = H
(
X
(ℓ1)
)
= H
(
X
(ℓ1)
∣∣Q)−H(X(ℓ1) ∣∣A(ℓ1)[1:n],Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(14)
= I
(
X
(ℓ1) ;A
(ℓ1)
[1:n]
∣∣Q)
= H
(
A
(ℓ1)
[1:n]
∣∣∣Q)−H(A(ℓ1)[1:n]
∣∣∣X(ℓ1),Q)
≤ H
(
A
(ℓ1)
[1:n]
∣∣∣Q)− r−1∑
v=1
(k
n
)v
L, (15)
where (14) follows since any message is independent of the
queries Q, and knowing the answers A
(ℓ1)
[1:n] and the queries Q,
one can determine X(ℓ1); (15) holds because of (13).
Finally, the converse proof is completed by showing that
R =
L∑n
j=1 H
(
A
(ℓ1)
j
)
≤
L
H
(
A
(ℓ1)
[1:n]
) (16)
≤
L
H
(
A
(ℓ1)
[1:n]
∣∣∣Q) (17)
≤
1
1 +
∑r−1
v=1
(
k
n
)v = CPLC, (18)
where (16) holds because of the chain rule of entropy, (17)
is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and we
apply (15) to obtain (18).
VI. CONCLUSION
We have provided the capacity of PLC for DSSs, where
data is encoded and stored using an arbitrary linear code from
the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes. Interestingly,
the capacity is equal to the corresponding PIR capacity. Thus,
privately retrieving arbitrary linear combinations of the stored
messages does not incur any overhead in rate compared to
retrieving a single message from the databases.
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